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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff-appellant, Erkan Ereren, submits this Brief in reply to the Brief
of defendant-appellee, Snowbird Corporation. Dr. Ereren stands by his legal
analysis, and its application to the instant dispute, set forth in his Opening
Brief. He incorporates and seeks to refrain from unnecessarily repeating the
factual and record history, and the arguments, regarding the accuracy and
correctness of which he remains confident, that appear in that Opening Brief.
Dr. Ereren seeks, by this Reply Brief, to point out inaccuracies that
appear in Snowbird's Brief and flaws of Snowbird's legal analysis, and to
reiterate his position that this Court should reverse and remand for new trial.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

SNOWBIRD HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY COUNTERED,
BECAUSE IT CANNOT, DR. EREREN'S CONTENTION THAT HE
IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF JUDGE
WILKINSON' DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO COMPEL.

As explained at pages 8-11 and 16-23 of his Opening Brief, Dr. Ereren
(who diligently sought and, according to the jury's verdict, needed
corroboration of his account 1 of the subject incident) attempted to discover the
identity of the ski instructor and the identities of "Dr. Scott" and his wife.
Snowbird refused, in the face of the liberal language of Rule 26(b)(1), to provide
information "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence/' Judge Wilkinson erroneously and in the abuse of whatever

1

Dr. Ereren gave consistent, detailed accounts of the events of the day of the subject incident
in his deposition (e.g., R. 1415, Tr. 27-57; 88-92) and at trial (e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 445-50; 45168).

discretion he had, and without affording Dr. Ereren an opportunity for hearing,
accepted Snowbird's position in its entirety. As explained in Dr. Ereren's
Opening Brief, at 16-18, the information provided by Snowbird, a party which
devised and had Judge Wilkinson enforce its own ground rules for what
Dr. Ereren could and could not discover in this litigation, were incomplete and
unsatisfactory.
Contrary to Snowbird's position, the Rules really do require parties to
provide information and documentation reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. This is true even in situations like this,
where one might surmise that Dr. Ereren, if he had a perfect memory, would
have recalled the exact name of his Snowbird ski instructor and, if he had been
a more curious sharer of the Snowbird experience, might have learned and
kept the full name and address of "Dr. Scott" and his wife. It was not
incumbent on Dr. Ereren to accept, on blind faith, Snowbird's limited recitation
of the identities of ski instructors who might fit the bill. This is especially true
because, as explained in Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief at 17, the Snowbird ski
school director acknowledged (R. 1412, Tr. 375-76), contrary to what is set
forth in Snowbird's Brief in the first paragraph of page 18, that the daily logs,
purporting to show the names of all ski instructors who taught on a given day,
are not necessarily completely accurate. Also unsatisfactory was the fact that
Snowbird produced a photo array of only 42 of its probably more than 75
female instructors (R. 1411, Tr. 231) from which, according to "Snowbird's
Rules of Discovery," Dr. Ereren was required to attempt to select his

2

instructor. 2 Given the size of this lawsuit (Dr. Ereren's evidence (R. 1413, Tr.
699) was that his loss of income and earning capacity alone was of a value in
excess of $4.5 million), if Snowbird had produced the names and addresses of
all of its female ski instructors, Dr. Ereren would have had and taken the
opportunity to determine for himself, rather than having Snowbird lay down
the law for him regarding the universe of his choices, who the ski instructor in
question actually was. That opportunity was, by reason of Snowbird's
objection and Judge Wilkinson's ruling, not afforded him.
Similarly, despite his own valiant efforts3 to locate "Dr. Scott" and his
wife, Dr. Ereren was unable to locate corroborative testimony from skiers in his
class. Snowbird's response to the discovery requests having to do with
Dr. Ereren's attempt to locate "Dr. Scott" is understandable, from an
adversarial perspective. Snowbird certainly did not want Dr. Ereren to discover
corroborating evidence. But Snowbird's objections to Dr. Ereren's legitimate
and critical discovery requests had no basis in law.
Snowbird does not even attempt to counter, because it cannot, the
proposition that, under Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah
App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 918 P.2d 459 (Utah 1996), a trial judge's
error in refusing to compel discovery is presumed prejudicial error or that,
2

It may also be important for the Court to keep in mind that absent from Snowbird's
explanation, and as was explained in Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief at footnote 1 (p. 9), is the fact
that Dr. Ereren agreed to limit his request for the identity of ski instructors to only female ski
instructors.
3

A review of Dr. Ereren's testimony on this subject, R. 1412, Tr. 446-49, shows that his efforts
were anything other than "half-hearted," as Snowbird has, at page 19 of its Brief, characterized
them.

3

given the central importance of the lack of corroborating evidence of
Dr. Ereren's account of what occurred, Snowbird is unable to overcome that
presumption. Snowbird relies, as it must, entirely on the proposition that it
was not error for Judge Wilkinson to rule as he did and that he did not abuse
his discretion in ruling as he did.
In support of its contention that Judge Wilkinson ruled correctly,
Snowbird relies on Pack v. Case, 2001 UT. App. 232. That case is different
from this case in several important particulars. First, there is no indication, in
the Pack opinion, that the party seeking discovery needed information and
documentation, from the party opposing discovery, to corroborate the seeking
party's version of the facts. Also, it is patent that Snowbird would have
objected to any deposition-conducted inquiry of the employees Snowbird
allowed Dr. Ereren to depose regarding the names and addresses of ski
instructors, people who took skiing lessons, physicians, and Florida residents.
Also, and in any event, among the witnesses who Snowbird deigned to allow to
be deposed, none would conceivably have known the names of all of the ski
instructors, all of the persons who took ski lessons in the relevant time period,
or all physicians or residents of Florida who stayed at Snowbird during the
relevant time period. 4 Also, with respect to the notion that Dr. Ereren had to
renew his Motion to Compel after taking depositions, motions to reconsider
(which is essentially what that would have been) are disfavored by the courts,

4

Nor would any individual likely have had the requested information at his or her fingertips.
By their nature the subject discovery requests required corporate information gathering and
review of documents.

4

and it is generally considered to be inappropriate for issues to be revisited with
the same judge, let alone asking a new judge, like Judge Livingston, to reverse
a ruling of a former judge, like Judge Wilkinson. Also, unlike the situation in
Pack, where this Court ruled that a request to provide the names of all the
persons who participated in the construction of a house was overly broad and
unduly burdensome because many workers participated in the construction of
the house, in this situation it was only the identities of one ski instructor and
two other eyewitnesses ("Dr. Scott" and his wife) that were being sought. The
problem was with determining the identity of those persons. Also unlike the
situation in Pack (see paragraph 32 of that opinion regarding helpful blueprints
obtainable from Salt Lake City), Dr. Ereren was in a spot where he needed
information that only Snowbird possessed. Also, this Court in Pack stated that
workers involved in the construction of the house would not have set foot upon
the roof of the house and would not have any knowledge of the work conducted
on the roof and that therefore "these employees could not provide information
relevant to the present case." 2001 UT App. 232, U 31 (emphasis added). That
is certainly not the case with respect to the persons the identities of whom
Dr. Ereren was seeking.
Dr. Ereren trusts that the foregoing explanation has shown that,
although Snowbird's citation of Pack has some superficial appeal, when the
issues of this case, particularly Dr. Ereren's need for corroboration, are
understood, the Pack case will be deemed not to be of determinative
significance. The inquiry should come back to the basic idea that parties are

5

expected to comply with discovery requests and trial courts are expected to
order non-compliant parties to comply. It was inappropriate for Snowbird to
take the position that the ground rules of discovery would be set by Snowbird.
And it was error for Judge Wilkinson to put his stamp of approval on that
procedure.
Snowbird makes much of the fact that it produced lots of documents and
information. That means very little. It is an all too common practice of some
litigants to provide information and documentation in such volume that it
serves as a smokescreen for the non-divulging of significant information and
documentation that an opposing litigant really wants to obtain. This Court
should not be buffaloed by Snowbird's implicit suggestion that it provided so
many things in discovery that it did not have to provide things that Dr. Ereren
really wanted and needed.
Also, the Court should understand that, lest it succumb to Snowbird's
efforts to persuade the Court that Dr. Ereren is a liar who fabricated the
account of his accident and repeatedly perjured himself, there is record
evidence - although it did not rise, to the jury's satisfaction, to the level of
satisfactory corroboration of his account - supportive of his claim. His
neurologist, Dr. Fares Elghazi (unfortunately, perhaps, for credibility purposes,
a friend (R. 1413, Tr. 619) of Dr. Ereren), submitted an Affidavit (R. 708-10)
and testified that Dr. Ereren told him, within two or three days of the incident
(R. 1413, Tr. 621) that he was experiencing neck pain and dizziness as a result
of his having recently been struck by a snowboarder while in a ski class at

6

Snowbird. R. 1413, Tr. 624-25. Dr. Elghazi also testified (R. 1413, Tr. 633,
635) that the problems for which he treated Dr. Ereren were related to the
trauma sustained in the ski accident and that Dr. Ereren had not told him of
any other accident. Also, Dr. Robert Bray, Dr. Ereren's neurosurgeon, testified
that the particular injury sustained by Dr. Ereren was rare and was completely
consistent with the account given by Dr. Ereren. R. 1413, Tr. 576-79. There
was no conflicting testimony. Also, Dr. Ereren picked his children up from the
Snowbird day care center at 3:45 p.m. on March 9 t h (R. 1412, Tr. 466, Ex. 4),
earlier than the 4:00 p.m. time (R. 1412, Tr. 372) that the ski class ended, and
received a credit (R. 1412, Tr. 466-68; Ex. 18) for returning his rental ski
equipment earlier, as a result of his having been injured, than he had planned.
Consider, also, Dr. Ereren's detailed account (R. 1412, Tr. 446-49) of his own
efforts to locate "Dr. Scott," and his testimony (R. 1412, Tr. 444-45) that he
had been "turning [his] house upside down trying to find" the business card of
his ski instructor or her paramour. Also, Snowbird's Mr. Hoffman
acknowledged, for what it's worth, and on whatever basis he acquired that
understanding, that he understood that Dr. Ereren's skiing accident took place
at Snowbird in a skiing accident in March of 1995. R. 1414, Tr. 762.
It was erroneous for Judge Wilkinson to accept Snowbird's argument
that Dr. Ereren's requests, or any of them, 5 were not of the kinds contemplated

5

The requests need to be viewed independently of one another and, if the Court determines
that Judge Wilkinson's ruling was incorrect with respect to any of them, even if correct with
respect to others, this Court should reverse, given the fact that they all went to discovering
critical corroborative evidence.

7

by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Snowbird's "invasion of
privacy" argument clearly has no basis in the law (if it did, little, if any,
information regarding any non-party witness would be discoverable). Nor,
especially given the size of this case and the importance of finding
corroborative evidence, were Dr. Ereren's subject requests overbroad or unduly
burdensome. Also noteworthy is the fact that, if it really thought the March 110, 1995 time period was too lengthy a period for producing information and
documentation regarding its Florida-resident and physician guests, Snowbird
never offered to produce the requested information or documentation for only,
for example, March 8 t h and 9 th . This Court should reverse and order a new
trial for Snowbird's failure to provide the requested information and
documentation and Judge Wilkinson's declining to compel Snowbird to
produce such things, regardless of the Court's determination of the other
aspects of this Appeal.
B.

SNOWBIRD HAS FAILED SATISFACTORILY TO COUNTER,
BECAUSE IT CANNOT, DR. EREREN'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF
DR. EREREN'S GAMBLING, BANKRUPTCY, AND SUPPOSED
SHADY FINANCIAL REPORTING TO COME TO THE ATTENTION
OF THE JURY.

This Court should pierce Snowbird's protestations of innocence and, by
reviewing the record in this case, as brought to the Court's attention in
Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief, realize that Snowbird did not really have or pursue
a defense against Dr. Ereren's damages case, in anything approaching a
forthright fashion. The true reason for Snowbird's putting on evidence of
Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy and of his supposedly improper use of
8

two sets of books was to have the jury doubt his credibility and think ill of his
character. As explained in Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief at 24 and as the jury
was instructed, the question of whether Dr. Ereren's business was "thriving* or
whether he won or lost money gambling or whether he had or had not ever
gone into bankruptcy 6 had nothing to do with his damages claims. See, e.g.,
testimony of Dr. Paul Randle, Dr. Ereren's economic loss expert, R. 1413, Tr.
688-89. 7 The pertinent parts of Dr. Ereren's records were the Schedule Cs to
his tax returns, which relate to the production of his business income. R.
1413, Tr. 672.
Snowbird was determined, in its desire to impugn Dr. Ereren's
credibility, attack his character, and cause the jury to dislike him, to make him
look as dirty as it could. Snowbird's naive or false contention, in its Brief at
31, that the voir dire process necessarily successfully rooted out any prejudice
against heavy gamblers or people who have filed bankruptcy or people who
have discharged gambling and loan debts via bankruptcy manifests a basic
misunderstanding or intentional understatement of the functional limitations
of the voir dire process. If voir dire were always satisfactory in rooting out
6

Lest there be any uncertainty, Dr. Ereren did not seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws
until 1997, some two years after his subject accident, and after his physical ability to perform
surgeries had, by reason of his subject neck injury, diminished to almost nothing. For
evidence pertaining to the occupational significance of his subject ski-incident injury, see, e.g.,
testimony of his neurosurgeon (R. 1413, Tr. 580-86) and his neurologist (R. 1413, Tr. 637-39).
7

One of the many misrepresentations and overstatements that plague Snowbird's Brief (for
more examples, see part D (infra at 19-23) of this Argument) is its statement, at 28, that
"Dr. Randle did admit that for a physician in private practice to be economically successful, he
must also be a good businessman." (Emphasis added.) The Court should review the cited
portion of the record (R. 1413, Tr. 704) to see what Dr. Randle really said. He simply
acknowledged the truism that to be in private practice a physician had to be a businessman.

9

prospective jurors who might rule against a party based on things other than
the pertinent evidence, there would be no purpose for motion in limine practice.
The exercise of asking prospective jurors about their feelings regarding people
who gamble and people who have filed for bankruptcy protection was
something Dr. Ereren asked for, in the hope of minimizing the expected
prejudicial effect of the evidence, only after Judge Livingston had denied his
motions in limine regarding gambling and bankruptcy matters. The fact that
Judge Livingston asked the prospective jurors about their feelings did not
unring the bell that Judge Livingston had already determined, by his pre-trial
rulings, would be rung.
Snowbird's entire argument regarding the injection of gambling and
bankruptcy into the trial of this case rests on the premise that those things
were relevant to the damages issues in this case. As Dr. Ereren through his
counsel sought unsuccessfully to explain to Judge Livingston in pre-trial
proceedings, neither of those things truly had, as explained hereinabove and in
Dr. Ereren's Opening Brief, anything to do with Dr. Ereren's damages. Nor did
the testimony of Snowbird's Mr. Hoffman, including his discussion of
Dr. Ereren's two sets of financial records, have anything truly to do with
Dr. Ereren's damages. That was clearly extrinsic evidence prohibited by Rule
608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 8 Never did Snowbird, through

8

Contrary to Snowbird's statement, at page 26 of its Brief, that Rule 608 pertains only to
extrinsic evidence introduced solely for the purpose of impeaching a witness's credibility, Rule
608(b) is not so limited. And the Court should keep in mind, as an indication of the true
purpose of Snowbird's getting all the dirt it could into evidence, Snowbird's statement (R. 102324), in its memorandum in opposition to the motion in limine that sought to keep such things

10

Mr. Hoffman's testimony or otherwise, logically link, because it could not do so,
Dr. Ereren's gambling history, or his bankruptcy, or his use of two sets of
books 9 with any of the real damages issues.
The unalterable fact is that it was Dr. Ereren's loss of ability to perform
surgeries that caused him to sustain a severe loss of income and earning
capacity. He had lost substantial sums gambling before his skiing accident, in
years he still was able to earn several hundred thousand dollars a year
performing surgeries, and he continued to gamble, for a period of time, after
the occurrence of that accident. No one suggested that his ability to make
money, which is what the law on income-related damages in Utah is all about
and on which the jury was instructed, had anything to do with his gambling or
bankruptcy or use of different sets of financial records. Even Snowbird's
economist, Mr. Hoffman, who works "full-time doing lost profits valuations" (R.
1414, Tr. 741), acknowledged (R. 1414, Tr. 766) that his analysis had nothing
to do with Dr. Ereren's physical ability, or lack thereof, to perform surgeries
any more. Snowbird somehow persuaded Judge Livingston of the relevance of

out of evidence, that "[t]he core issue in this case is whether Dr. Ereren's testimony as to the
incident is credible." (Emphasis added.)
Also, the Court should keep in mind that Judge Livingston's ruling regarding
Mr. Hoffman's Rule 608(b)-prohibited extrinsic evidence testimony and exhibits should be
reviewed under a "correctness" standard, rather than an "abuse-of-discretion" standard. E.g.,
State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 704 (Utah App. 1993).
9

Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 29 of its Brief, that "[i]t was an integral part of
Mr. Hoffman's testimony to review Ereren's financial statements, whether they conflicted or
not, and to explain which information he used in his analysis" (emphasis added), Dr. Ereren
points out that a reading of that statement, as well as a reading of the portions of
Mr. Hoffman's testimony there cited (R. 1414, Tr. 751-55), shows that, even if there was some
conceivable relevance to Mr. Hoffman's testimony, generally, about Dr. Ereren's supposedly
declining "business," there was absolutely no valid reason for bringing to the jury's attention
the fact that there were any conflicting financial statements.
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Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy history and of his use of different sets of
books for supposedly improper purposes. This Court should understand that
the subject evidence had nothing really to do with Dr. Ereren's damages and
should not allow itself to be persuaded by Snowbird's argument to the
contrary.
Snowbird makes much, in its Brief at the top of page 29, of the
proposition that Dr. Ereren's "business" was "declining under its debt burden."
But Instructions Nos. 33 and 35, the income-related damages instructions and the law on which the jury was instructed (Snowbird sought no alternative
instructions and stipulated to these instructions) - do not deal with the status
of Dr. Ereren's "business," as opposed to what he had earned and could, but
for the subject incident, have continued to earn, as a surgeon. Nor does the
unpaid principal and interest on Dr. Ereren's practice loans have, contrary to
Snowbird's suggestion, at page 28 of its Brief, anything to do with his income
or earning capacity.
Snowbird erroneously relies on the case of Dente v. Riddell, Inc., 664
F.2d 1 (1 s t Cir. 1981), in support of its contention that Judge Livingston
properly allowed evidence of Dr. Ereren's gambling. As Snowbird points out, at
page 30 of its Brief, the plaintiff in Dente alleged that his social life had been
ruined by the defendant's negligence. That and the eliciting of certain evidence
at trial (id. at 3-5) caused the court in that case to determine that evidence of
the plaintiffs gambling activities could appropriately be admitted. Dr. Ereren
made no claim, in this case, that his social life had been ruined by Snowbird's

12

negligence. Nor did his counsel in any sense "open the door" to a discussion of
gambling. Snowbird's reliance on the Dente case, in these circumstances, is
indicative of the weakness of Snowbird's position.
A case that is of considerable significance, in the event that this Court
determines that there was any probative value whatsoever to any of the
evidence at issue, 1 0 is Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 992 P.2d 969 (Utah
1999). There the Utah Supreme Court undertook a Rule 403 analysis to
determine whether the prejudicial effect of evidence of the plaintiffs receipt of
social security benefits substantially outweighed its probative value. In the
absence of any actual showing of prejudice (something that Snowbird seems
erroneously here to demand as a condition of reversal), the Supreme Court,
observing that "[e]vidence that Robinson received disability benefits is
potentially very prejudicial," and recognizing the slight probative value of the
evidence (if there was any probative value to the evidence here at issue, it was,
given its marginal, if any, relevance to Dr. Ereren's damages, similarly slight),
ruled that the trial court should not have admitted that evidence. Id, at 97576. Evidence of heavy gambling, bankruptcy, discharge in bankruptcy of
gambling and loan debts, and use of two sets of financial books is palpably at
least as potentially prejudicial as was evidence of Mr. Robinson's receipt of
disability benefits.
10

The Court does not need to reach this part of the analysis unless it determines, contrary to
Dr. Ereren's primary contention, that any of the evidence in question was relevant. Also, if the
Court accepts, as it should (see n. 8, at p. 10-11, supra), Dr. Ereren's contention that the
question of the admissibility of Mr. Hoffman's extrinsic evidence testimony and exhibits should
be governed by a "correctness" standard, the Court should not get to a Rule 403 weighing
analysis, and should simply find legal error regarding that ruling.
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Snowbird seeks to persuade this Court, at pages 33-36 of its Brief, that,
assuming Judge Livingston abused his discretion in allowing evidence of
Dr. Ereren's gambling, bankruptcy, and supposedly questionable financial
reporting practices, Dr. Ereren cannot prevail on this part of the Appeal
because he cannot show that any such evidentiary ruling was harmful.
Snowbird attempts to convince this Court that there was such a supposed
abundance of evidence supporting the jury's verdict and that this Court should
determine that any abuse of discretion was harmless.
First, Dr. Ereren points out that Snowbird conveniently neglects to
mention, anywhere in its Brief, this Court's decision in Roundv v. Staley, 984
P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999), discussed at pages 1, 29, and 30 of Dr. Ereren's
Opening Brief. In particular, Snowbird does not mention the following part of
this Court's decision in Roundv:
Staley argues that admission of Gunderson's testimony and the
tape was harmless because this evidence was relevant only to the
issue of damages - an issue the jury did not reach. However, a
determination of liability in this case hinged on the parties'
credibility. Because Staley introduced Gunderson's testimony in
the tape to impeach Roundy's credibility, this evidence was directly
relevant to the issue of liability. Furthermore the record reveals
that this case largely hinged on Roundy's testimony versus
Staley's. ... Therefore, if Roundy's testimony had not been
impeached by admission of Gunderson's testimony and the tape, it
is reasonably likely that the jury might have reached a differentverdict. We therefore conclude the trial court's error in admitting
Gunderson's testimony in the tape without prior disclosure was
harmful.
Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
It is manifest, given the emphasized language from Roundv, that
Snowbird is wrong in its contention, made at page 33 of its Brief, that
14

Dr. Ereren "must essentially marshal all of the other evidence supporting the
verdict and demonstrate that all of the other evidence is not enough to
maintain confidence in the jury's verdict." Roundv was a case, like virtually
every case that is tried, in which other impeachment evidence and other
evidence otherwise supporting the verdict was presented. This Court did not,
however, in Roundv require the appellant to engage in any marshalling
exercise, and there is no reason why this Court should require Dr. Ereren to do
so as a condition of his being granted a new trial.
In any event, the Court may consider it important for Dr. Ereren to
respond to some of the particulars denominated a. through L, posited by
Snowbird (at pages 33-36 of its Brief) as reasons why the jury could,
independent of the evidence about Dr. Ereren's gambling history, bankruptcy,
and supposed financial reporting shenanigans, correctly have found
Dr. Ereren's account not credible.
In response to item a., Dr. Ereren explains that he never claimed that the
incident took place on March 8, 1995. The contention in the Complaint was on
or about March 8 th . R. 2. Dr. Ereren, who hoped he would get better and not
have to pursue a lawsuit, who put off undergoing surgery for more than two
years after the incident, who refrained from instituting litigation for nearly four
years after the incident, and who did not originally focus on the idea of suing
anyone over the subject incident, cannot fairly be faulted for having had some
initial uncertainty about the date of the incident.
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Responding to item b., Dr. Ereren points out that not only Dr. Scott, but
also Dr. Scott's wife and the ski instructor were present at the time the subject
incident occurred. R. 1413, Tr. 462.
Responding to item c , Dr. Ereren acknowledges that the evidence is that
collisions are supposed to be reported but asks this Court to understand that it
is certainly within the realm of human experience that the instructor in
question may simply never have reported the subject incident because of her
realization that she had made a mistake and her hope that Dr. Ereren had not
been badly hurt. And see, e.g., testimony of Snowbird's ski instructor, Georgia
Dumais (R. 1412, Tr. 344-45), for record support for the proposition that not
all Snowbird ski instructors will necessarily follow established protocol.
Responding to item d., Dr. Ereren explains, as he did at length in the
summary judgment proceedings in this case (see, e.g., R. at 591; 596-98; 69697), that the reason he "changed his testimony" is that he, who had never been
to Snowbird before his ill-fated trip in March of 1995, was not at all familiar
with the subject terrain and that he based his initial testimony on a Snowbird
map that did not show the cat track below which the ski instructor positioned
him. He initially thought the incident must have happened just below
Rothman Way because that is the only cat track shown on Snowbird's map in
the general vicinity (Chip's Run) where the incident occurred. It was only after
the taking of the deposition of Ronald Wolthuis, one of his planned trial
witnesses; that Dr. Ereren and his counsel realized that the place that the
Snowbird instructor had positioned him was farther down the mountain than
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Rothman Way. See, also, R. at 856. This is no indication, although Snowbird
tried to make it such, of Dr. Ereren's lack of credibility.
Responding to item g., Dr. Ereren points out that he had made
substantial progress in his days of skiing (R. 1413, Tr. 440, 443; 449-50) and
that he was an experienced athlete and one who was used to physical contact
(R. 1413, Tr. 450, 463).
Responding to item h., Dr. Ereren points out that he still hoped he would
get better a year after the accident, had not yet determined to sue Snowbird,
and did not want to deny his family the opportunity of having an enjoyable
experience. He did not ski when he took his family back.
Responding to item i., Dr. Ereren acknowledges that the Snowbird
instructors Snowbird put u p as the only ones who could have fit the bill for the
instructor in question testified as Snowbird says they testified; but it cannot be
conclusively said that those were the only Snowbird instructors who taught
that day. See the testimony of Steve Bills, Snowbird's ski school director. R.
1412, Tr. 375-76.
Responding to item j . , Dr. Ereren points out that he testified that,
compared to his neck injury sustained in the subject incident, the tensionrelated neck pain he had experienced prior to that time was insignificant and
that it had ceased well prior to the time of the incident. R. 1413, Tr. 610-11.
Responding to item 1., Dr. Ereren responds that the reason his wife did
not testify was that the Ererens have two young children and she needed to
stay home with them. They attended school. R. 1413, Tr. 479. She was, in
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any event, not an eyewitness to the subject event.
Dr. Ereren trusts that the Court will understand the significance, to the
extent of undermining confidence in the jury's verdict (or, in the words of this
Court in Roundv (984 P.2d at 409): "... it is reasonably likely the jury might
have reached a different verdict"), of the wrongful and erroneous introduction
of Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy history and of his different sets of
financial records. This Court cannot say that the erroneous admission of the
extrinsic evidence of the two sets of books or of Dr. Ereren's gambling and
bankruptcy history did not work to undermine Dr. Ereren's credibility before
the jury. This situation is very similar to the situation in Roundv (something
Snowbird has not contested), and this Court should do what it did in Roundv
and remand for a new trial.

C.

SNOWBIRD DISTORTS THE HISTORY OF THE CASE IN
SUGGESTING THAT DR. EREREN WAS NOT SURPRISED BY
THE TESTIMONY OF SNOWBIRD PERSONNEL REGARDING
THE LACK OF JUMPING IN THE AREA OF THE SUBJECT
INCIDENT.

As mentioned hereinabove, at 16-17, in response to item d. of Snowbird's
recitation of supposed facts supposedly undermining Dr. Ereren's credibility,
Dr. Ereren was unable correctly to relate the scene of the subject incident to a
particular Snowbird location until shortly before trial, when Mr. Wolthuis, who
had traveled to the location pointed out by Dr. Ereren to his counsel, explained
(R. 861-65; 856) that that location was not as far up the mountain as was the
Rothman Way location. See, also, Dr. Ereren's Affidavit (R. 857-59). The
deposition testimony of Snowbird personnel on which Snowbird at pages 39-41
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of its Brief relies came about as a result of Dr. Ereren's erroneous identification, caused by Snowbird's inaccurate map, of the location of the incident.
Dr. Ereren and his counsel had no reason to believe that, once the
correct area had been identified, Snowbird personnel would testify that that
area was one not frequently, if ever, used for jumping. Snowbird's purported
reliance on the depositions of Mr. Black and Ms. Durtschi, in which the
questions dealt with the terrain in the immediate vicinity of Rothman Way, is
disingenuous. Snowbird is well aware of the relevant history. The deposition
testimony regarding non-jumping had nothing to do with the location
presented at trial by Dr. Ereren as the location where the subject incident
occurred, and Snowbird cannot fairly rely on deposition testimony dealing with
a different location to contend that Dr. Ereren was not surprised by the trial
testimony of the Snowbird witnesses. In this circumstance, Turner v. Nelson,
872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), is not directly dispositive. Although
acknowledging that this is a closer question than the other issues he is
pursuing in this Appeal, Dr. Ereren urges the Court to recognize that it was
error, and, given the critical issues of credibility in this case, prejudicial error,
for Judge Livingston to refuse to allow Dr. Ereren to call Mr. Gilchrist as a
rebuttal witness.
D.

SNOWBIRD HAS MISSTATED AND OVERSTATED THE STATUS
OF THE RECORD IN NUMEROUS PARTICULARS IN ADDITION
TO THOSE DISCUSSED ABOVE.

In its effort to uphold the jury verdict and judgment, Snowbird has
misstated and overstated the record in various particulars in addition to those
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specifically discussed above. In the interest of seeking to set the record
straight, and at the risk of some repetition, Dr. Ereren points out the following
examples of such inaccuracies:
1.

Responding to item 9 (set forth at page 8 of Snowbird's Brief) of

Snowbird's "Statement of Facts," which contends that Dr. Ereren "changed his
testimony to claim that the accident occurred in an entirely different location
on the ski mountain" (emphasis added), Dr. Ereren invites the Court to take a
look at the Snowbird map, reproduced at, among other places, R. 696. There
is, on that map, perhaps an inch or two's distance between the original
location, just below Rothman Way, and the location (near the intersection of
Chip's Face and Chip's Run, just downhill from the Rothman Way location)
regarding which Dr. Ereren testified at trial.
2.

Responding to item 13 of that "Statement of Facts," appearing on

page 9, Dr. Ereren points out that Snowbird's Shirley Durtschi testified (R.
1412, Tr. 336) that there are "several Lauras" at the ski school and
acknowledged that she testified in her deposition that there was a young girl
named Laura who taught "mostly children." R. 1412, Tr. 337.
3.

Responding to Snowbird's statement, in its "Summary of

Argument," appearing at page 12 of its Brief, Dr. Ereren states that it is simply
wrong for Snowbird to represent that he ever "refused to specify the date of the
accident, the identities of any witnesses or even the location of the alleged
accident."
4.

Responding to the last sentence of page 12 of Snowbird's Brief,
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Dr. Ereren points out that there is no support whatsoever for the proposition
that he testified that neither of the Snowbird ski instructors who testified at
trial was the ski instructor who taught him because their testimony regarding
the impossibility of the accident was too credible.
5.

Responding to the statement, appearing at page 17 of Snowbird's

Brief, that the "identity of instructors employed as of March 8, 1995, is
meaningless," Dr. Ereren points out that Snowbird itself h a s acknowledged, in
item 10 of its "Statement of Facts," set forth at page 8 of its Brief, that
Dr. Ereren skied with the same female ski instructor two days in a row. Also,
both in his deposition testimony (R. 1415, Tr. 27-28) and in his trial testimony
(R. 1412, Tr. 1441), Dr. Ereren testified that he skied with the same female ski
instructor on the 8 t h and 9 t h of March.
6.

Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 19 of its Brief, that

Mr. Bills "speculated" that a document pertaining to people who purchased ski
school tickets on March 9, 1995 had been found at one time but could not later
be located, Dr. Ereren feels constrained to point out that Mr. Bills's testimony
clearly rose above "speculation." R. 1412, Tr. 365.
7.

Responding to the Snowbird statement, made at page 19 of its

Brief, that he made no effort to locate "Dr. Scott" until 2000 or the end of 1999,
Dr. Ereren states that for years he did not know that Snowbird would question
his account or that he would require corroborative testimony. It must be
recalled that this litigation was not even initiated until December 1998.
8.

Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 20 of its Brief, that a
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Snowbird ski school "sales listing" document would not include any number,
address, or other "identifying information" and that, accordingly, if the name of
someone with a first name of Scott had shown u p on that document, there
would be nothing to designate him as the "Scott" with whom Dr. Ereren claims
to have been skiing, it is important to understand that, with a last name,
Dr. Ereren would, in today's information age, likely have been able to locate
"Dr. Scott," and that, in any event, under the Rule of Askew v. Hardman,
whether he could or could not in fact have located Dr. Scott is not outcomedeterminative on the issue.
9.

Responding to Snowbird's contention, at page 25 of its Brief, that

once Dr. Ereren had obtained a loan for his practice he "actually took the
money to Las Vegas and lost it gambling," Dr. Ereren states that Snowbird's
record citation does not at all support that statement. Indeed, Dr. Ereren
explained (R. 1413, Tr. 531) that the large sum he lost was lost over a 15-year
period, not j u s t after the loan was funded.
10.

Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 25 of its Brief, that

the hospital that Dr. Ereren had sued in a business dispute had countersued
him for defaulting on another substantial practice loan, Dr. Ereren points out
that the Court's review of the record cited by Snowbird will show that there is
nothing there to support that contention.
11.

Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 25 of its Brief, that

Dr. Ereren's inability to pay back his practice debts, loan interests and
attorney's fees, caused him to file for bankruptcy in 1997, Dr. Ereren points

22

out that a review of the record cited by Snowbird will show that there is no
support for that statement.
12.

Responding to Snowbird's explanation, at page 27 of its Brief, of its

counsel's determination not to argue damages, Dr. Ereren acknowledges that
defense lawyers sometimes, for strategic purposes, do not argue damages, but
points out that, especially given all the energy and resources that Snowbird put
into its supposed damages defense, that explanation seems, in the particulars
of this case, to be implausible. Also, Snowbird's reference to its counsel's
"limited time" for closing argument seems disingenuous; a review of the record
(R. 1414, Tr. 833-95) will cause the Court to recognize that Dr. Ereren's
counsel took more than twice the time Snowbird's counsel took to deliver his
closing argument.
13.

Responding to Snowbird's statement, at page 36 of its Brief,

regarding "the invaluable opportunity the jury had to observe Ereren's evasive
demeanor while testifying," Dr. Ereren responds that that is not the stuff of
appellate review and that he takes vigorous issue with Snowbird's characterization of his demeanor. He, especially for one whose native language is not
English, stepped u p to the plate and answered questions as well as he could.
E.

IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR SNOWBIRD TO INTRODUCE, IN ITS
ADDENDUM, LETTERS FROM ITS COUNSEL TO DR. EREREN'S
COUNSEL THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE TRIAL RECORD.
ALSO, THOSE LETTERS PRESENT AN INCOMPLETE AND
MISLEADING PICTURE.

Snowbird has inappropriately included in its Brief, as Addendum B,
selected correspondence from its counsel to Dr. Ereren's counsel. It has not
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included the other side of the correspondence, and almost all the
correspondence it has included is not referenced to any part of the district
court record. The letters give an incomplete and one-sided version of
communications between counsel and attempt to slant things Snowbird's way.
The Court should disregard the contents of Addendum B.
If the Court thinks it appropriate to consider any of those materials, and,
particularly, if the Court thinks there is any significance to the letter dated
April 24, 2000, Dr. Ereren urges the Court to understand that he did not
absolutely identify his ski instructor as being Andrea Martin. His Interrogatory
answer and trial testimony (R. 1412, Tr. 443) was that, among the faces
represented in that array, Ms. Martin 11 seemed most to resemble the ski
instructor in question. Dr. Ereren also points out that it is most unlikely,
contrary to the letter of November 15, 2000, from Snowbird's counsel to
Dr. Ereren's counsel, that Snowbird had no identifying information (address,
phone number, or contact person) in addition to what is set forth on the
computer printout attached to that letter. More importantly, Snowbird's giving
of the names of organizations putting on seminars was not a sufficient
response to Dr. Ereren's discovery requests geared toward learning the identity
of Dr. Scott.
m.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis and that set forth in his Opening Brief,

11

Lest the Court wonder what became of the Andrea Martin aspect of this case: Snowbird
submitted an Affidavit from Ms. Martin (R. 352-53) attesting to the fact that she was not the
instructor in question.
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Dr. Ereren urges the Court to reverse Judge Wilkinson's denial of Dr. Ereren's
Motion to Compel, to order Snowbird to provide the requested information and
documentation (which Snowbird still does not deny having), to reverse Judge
Livingston's rulings on the motions in limine regarding gambling, bankruptcy,
and financial reporting, to reverse Judge Livingston's ruling regarding
Dr. Ereren's desired calling of a rebuttal witness, and to remand for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

<£ *

day of February, 2002.
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